Format of the Blog

The blog will consist of articles and analysis with news updates with its corresponding analysis. Careful consideration of the elements with news updates will be noted, as this blog deals with evidence based imagery. Evidence for imagery will be obtained from Google Earth or from other military photos proving acquisition. Articles with the longer lengths tend to be analysis on recent developments based on imagery or other sources while news updates will provide the picture of the geopolitics involved in the region carefully explaining the possible analysis while reiterating its possible or probable sketchiness.

The Caucasus will be covered as a region, though concentrating on the Nagorno Karabagh conflict. More importantly any conflict that might affect the region such as a strike on Iran will be covered and other air defense issues such as Syria though more often than not an outlook after a conflict to better understand the technology involved.

History will not take part unless a bases is needed for new readers in understanding the region. One article on the peace talks explaining the stalemate might be posted though from a negotiation perspective, return of lands and possible Azeri objectives in the next conflict. This article will cover the Madrid principles and explain how internationally recognized borders could potentially will play a large part in the next conflict. Soon I will post up my old articles on Azerbaijani air defense systems and Armenian air defense systems which will cover the new developments and acquisitions in full analysis in light of its effects on a possible new conflict.

My email, is in my profile and feel free to ask questions and enlighten me with on new developments that might need a write up or explanations that need to be covered to understand the region better.

Could Armenia be possibly entering another level of military acquisition?

Gyumri Russian Air defense Batallion where the S300V is based.

Recent reports of new defense deals between Armenia and Russia has surfaced in the news and prior defense agreements that were ratified have since not come to light in terms of solid advancements in the Armenian military. More importantly from an image analysis perspective, no concrete evidence of the recent reports of the Russian base acquiring the new Iskander missiles and Tornado multiple launch rocket systems has come to light. Many of these systems show up in military photos soon after a leak in its acquisition.

“Russia has deployed an advanced new missile system to its base in Armenia,amid deteriorating relations with Armenia's rival, Azerbaijan. A source in Armenia's Defense Ministry confirmed to RFE/RL's Armenian service the deployment of "several" Iskander-M systems” Source Eurasianenews, The Bugg Pit by Joshua Kucera

The most recent news on the upgrading of the Russian bases in Armenia and its air force has been ratified with the visit of the Russian defense minister to Armenia and the General secretary of CSTO (Collective security Council).

13 Mig-29's in the picture with one right outside the hanger exiting from refurbishment.

Only 4 visible Mig-29 in the above picture, others possibly in  hanger and or out in flight training.

The above imagery analysis provides us information on the continuous refurbishments of the MIG-29’s stationed at the Erebuni air base obvious requirements in keeping a fit military alliance. With additional pictures from "Pilot.Strizhi.info" (not seen here) we can see work completions on the MIGS. Thanks to “Open Source Imint” another open source expert on imagery analysis has reliable information from “Janes World Air Forces” on a massive increase in flight training conducted by Russian pilots at the Erebuni air base. With the latest news regarding developments at the Russian bases in Armenia the possible acquisition of the Iskander is highlighted. With recent arms sales to Azerbaijan the tides of balance have tipped heavily on the Azerbaijani side, reinforcing the balance is necessary as part Russia security guarantees to Armenia.

Patterns in military developments tell us to be aware of sketchy news though in light of the recent reports in the ratification of new deals between Armenia and Russia and more importantly the balance tipping acquisitions from Azerbaijan with the more important issue of Armenia's minuscule military tells us that new developments either at the Russian bases or with the Armenian military is highly likely.

If acquired Iskanders, are in the inventory of the Russian base it yields potential power base for Russia to stop the next possible war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The possibility of the Armenians having their hands on equipment such as the sophisticated Iskander ballistic missile, which are capable of manoeuvre through its ballistic flight path to evade air defense systems, is another analysis per se in particular its effectivness against the new S300PMU-2 of Azerbaijan. Though its acquisition itself will offset the large military confidence of Azerbaijan. Other upgrades that Armenia will receive will be interesting to keep a keen eye on.

Sources...

Eurasia.net, Joshua Kucera
Google Earth
Imint Analysis
OPen Source Imint
Janes Portal

“Azerbaijan’s Military Build-up”

Sumgait air base with it MIG-29's

Global Geo-politics often shape the way we perceive events and potential threats. And while super powers on all sides, manipulate media to garner public opinion towards there foreign policy objectives the objectiveness in mass media is a concern. Currently the world has its eyes on North Korea, Iran and Syria all a threat to Western policy makers. Military build ups are not a thing of the past and as the Cold War has deteriorated, over time, many nations have fallen into the trap of large scale military build ups. Often overlooked is the massive build-up of arms with Azerbaijan.

An ally of the West, it has largely escaped media and bad press largely due to its lucrative oil deals with multi-national companies in the US and UK. The small scale cold war between Russian ally Armenia, and Turkish/Nato ally Azerbaijan is one that has been off the radar in Western Media outlets. The motivated rhetoric from Azerbaijani’s and its President Aliyev towards the Armenians has not filtered out to the media in western news outlets though the large scale persecution of the inhabitants of Nagorno Karabagh were part of the media during the Soviet era even in the West, reaching as far as Australian news.

Since the 1994 cease fire both sides have been digging in with Armenia in a defensive position due to its vulnerability as a smaller nation and its fear of a retaliatory attack from the losing side.The Armenian side is a heavily fortified line of trenches interconnected to form a defensive barrier needed to repel an attack.  In the early years of military build-up, Armenia with its advantage in discipline, kept the upper hand behind a much larger Azerbaijani military budget with superior trenches, defensive positions and more cohesiveness in its ranks. In the year 2013 the tides have dramatically turned, Armenia with its approx 400 million dollar military budget is falling behind against Azerbaijan’s approx 2.5 and possible 3.7 billion dollar budget. (Depending on various sources).

Azerbaijan’s military is one to reckon with, there trench systems have surpassed its counterparts on the Armenian side with longer lines interconnecting, forming formidable defensive and offensive positions.  Its air defense systems one of the most capable in the world, though limited in a more sophisticated theater of war it can repel a variety of air targets. S300PMU-2 air defense system with its two batteries and 6 launch vehicles each, provides the top tier of its air defense. Though a limited 6 launch simultaneous capability for each battery it still provides an anti-stealth and ballistic capability. The state of the art system nulls Armenia’s Scud B ballistic missiles which were intended to provide Armenia a direct hit on Baku oilfields, city and other strategic targets.  

Azerbaijan recent purchase of BUK-M1 air defense system provides another layer in its air defense, with its cruise missile capability and shoots and scoot maneuverability it adds another level of protection to the nation. Azerbaijan also posse’s a handful of short to medium altitude air defense systems with new upgrade packages from Ukraine and Israel. What does this mean? Well, not only this voids a chance of Armenia in entering its air space, it diminishes possibilities and possibly excludes small low level operations for close air support, and will potentially debunk Armenian ballistic missile attacks on its oil fields. It also denies larger powers a limited level of attack capability if an international intervention is needed.

Its air force has had a face lift as well, with Israeli modification on the SU-25 bombers, equipped with new edge night vision, landing stability controls and new lock on missile avionics the SU-25 would be the best in its class. The MIG 29 procurements from Ukraine and its upgrades closely resemble Armenian MIG-29 variant at Gyumri base. The Fulcrum C type with minimum air to ground avionics though capable in air to air combat provides a strong fleet of highly maneuverable air force fighter jets protecting the skies of Azerbaijan and providing an additional but limited air to ground capability.

UAV’s are another ballgame in the sphere of real-time warfare. With real time footage of the battle field these capabilities will provide an edge on the battlefield. Azerbaiajan’s UAV’s are also Israeli made and designed, providing a high level of technology in this department.

 In other fields of procurement is Russia’s Rostvertol  MI-35 helicopter the upraded version of the MI-24 are part of the larger sales of Azerbaijan,  providing it with relatively well upgraded helicopter package. Its attack capabilities in well needed mountainous terrain, provide better night vision and low level attack possibilities. The list continues with Smerch multiple launch rocket systems the largest and most devastating in its class which would be coupled with the Israeli made Lynx systems which are a light vehicle multiple launch rocket system also the most sophisticated in this class. Limiting the mention of its larger arsenal of Soviet made artillery and mortar equipment, the current inventory of artillery and multiple launch rocket systems provide a horrific arsenal in softening up defensive positions in the next conflict. It will also devastate the region. The military build-up has not only entered a new stage in its procurement of large amounts of heavy equipment but it’s also takes a step in technological advances.

So in a nutshell, its upgraded air force the Su-25 providing close range accurate support which out-class Armenian Su-25 counterparts, upgraded M1-35, will also provide support in mountainous terrain which again outclasses its Armenian opponent possibly evading air defense systems flying under radar in the mountainous region of Kelbajar. Its multiple launch rocket systems from Israel will provide accurate shelling of communication lines and defensive positions. And lastly there air defense systems will provide them the confidence in repelling of any retaliatory attack with Armenian ballistic, fighter jet capability and most importantly denies larger powers to intervene.

This large scale military build-up has its own merit, a relatively large build up considering the size of the nation. What its true battlefield capabilities are is something of different analyses needed. Though nevertheless a keen eye must be kept on Azerbaijan, as Alyev’s rhetoric has pre-empted a resumption of hostilities. And its continued arms build-up can have devastating effects not only for Armenia though for the region itself. Why this large scale military build-up has been out of Western media is something that needs to be dealt with as the hypocrisy of the West turning a blind eye towards an ally is nothing new.  When the next conflict arises another level of resentment towards the Azerbaijan’s from all people in the Caucasus is inevitable. 

Sources

Ria Navosti
Imint Analsyis
Rostvertol
Google Earth
CIA Factbook

A Closer look at the Frontline

The white arrow represents the Armenian trenches and the red arrow represents the Azerbaijani trenches. Take note of further dug outs and roads that lead back towards there respective area's. These are system of trenches and roads that lead to another set of trench systems with roads that link military bases. 

The above picture provides us with bird’s eye view of how close the trench systems of Armenia and Azerbaijan really are. The two trench systems above are a mere 500 meters away from each other, with the pin in-between depicting the demarcation line between Nagorno Karabagh and Azerbaijan. Although recent imagery provides us with information regarding trench systems and there development, thanks to Google earth history we can see continuous upgrades on front-line, as they interconnect to from a strong and typical defensive barrier. Both sides are continuously upgrading their front-lines.

Imagery analysis regarding light and heavy industry fabrication, ship dock repair yards, fighter jet maintenance buildings tend to be easier to identify. Although a trench is easily depicted on Google earth, rather identifying which trench belongs to which nation is of somewhat another issue. These two trench systems typically can present an analyzer with some issues. In this analysis further referencing with the demarcation line and roads leading back from each trench to its respective villages/bases concludes the opposing trenches. The last and most obvious giveaway is definitely the two head on trenches that directly face each other. Further elaborate and typical trench systems follow both sides of the demarcation line with military strongholds or bases within a frame work of both front-lines. 

Sources
-Image courtesy Google earth
-US Army Imagery analysis manual

Azeri S300PMU-2 Spotted

(Photo Courtesy of Sean O'Connors work from "Imint Analysis")

Sean O'Connor from 'Imint Analysis" has done it again, expert in the field of air defence and military he has spotted the location of the Azerbaijan’s latest military acquisition. The S300PMU-2 the most advanced system in air defence has been spotted near Sumgait and Shurabaad on the coastal waters.The above picture courtesy Sean O'connor from google earth depicts the S300 site. This acquisition has been largely kept out scope for Armenian media due to obvious reasons.

These current systems totally negate all ballistic capabilities Armenia once had to put a stop to the war early on in its phase.  A main ally of Armenia, Russia, selling a potential military advancement that can and has upset the balance of both sides is a worrying issue for Armenia.  A deep analysis can be drawn from this though in short, geopolitics tells us money in Russia’s piggy bank is not stopping a slight and potential military in-balance in the region. More importantly Russia’s involvement as an ally provides a sense of security for Armenia and at the cost of a large military sale it would not be an issue for Russian arms sales.

At the current state of the Armenian military all ballistic, and any threat of a larger theater of war has been totally negated with this new system. And with the purchase of further highly upgraded air defense packages, Armenia’s air arm will potentially have no chance in any dominance near the Nagorno Karabagh border or any other location in Azeri territory. 

Sources:
"Imint Analysis" Sean O'Connor
"Air Power Australia"
"Google Earth Imagery"

Nagorno Karabagh "Contact Line"

Stepanakert Airport under construction 2009

(Courtesy Google Earth)

Armenian president Serj Sarkisian announced that he will be the first passenger on the flight to the newly rebuilt airport in Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia has rebuilt the airport north of the capital Stepanakert. Azerbaijan maintains that Nagorno-Karabakh remains a part of the nation, and considers Nagorno-Karabakh’s airspace as its own.  Azerbaijan's continued rhetoric and its latest announcement that it will shoot down any plane that violates its airspace is of interest to anyone in the field of air defence and anyone who follows the politics of the volatile Caucasus.  These announcements call for a greater analysis of the region as any aggression against a head of state represents an act of war. It is important to know that Armenian forces control the Nagorno Karabakh airspace, and to understand how Azerbaijan may shoot down the airliner. 

Nagorno Karabakh is an area encompassing roughly 10 000 square kilometres. Fierce fighting from 1988 and an all out war from 1991 lead to the capture of Nagorno Karabakh and further territory outside the enclave of the considered Nagorno Karabagh region which is now a part of Armenian territory. Since the shaky cease-fire in 1994, sporadic firefights and sniper attacks occur on the contact line. Both sides are heavily armed and guarded with trenches similar to World War I. The Armenian side has feared an all-out attack since the cease-fire, especially with President Aliyev’s large military budget from oil revenue.  Armenia has fully fortified its lowlands with three lines of trenches reaching from the Mrav Mountains to the north to another mountain chain close to Fizuli in the south. No signs of compromise have been initiated from either side at the negotiation table.

The airport falls short of the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) battalions stationed in Azerbaijan. The 2K11 is a mobile system that can be relocated closer to the target. Higher echelon 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radars will ensure notification of the flight path and timing, allowing the 2K11 battery to close to the range needed to launch on a target arriving at Khankendi airport. A passenger airliner represents a cooperative target for the 2K11, making the 2K11 a likely SAM option for Azerbaijan’s purpose. Two main reasons account for this.  First Azerbaijan can account for the disaster as an accident, and second, it reduces its chances of their aircraft being downed from retaliatory fire if a fighter aircraft was scrambled to complete the job.  The engagement envelope of the 2K11, a medium to high altitude SAM system, must be considered. The 1S32 (PAT HAND) engagement radar will have difficulty illuminating the target in the mountainous terrain and at the maximum range of its engagement envelope.  The airliner will be descending to land reaching the airport, further complicating the 1S32’s illumination. This option will prove difficult for President Aliyev and therefore represents a possible but not probable scenario.

Azerbaijan's other option will be to scramble fighter aircraft such as the MiG-29S (FULCRUM-C) to fire air-to-air missiles. This will be the most effective way to bring down the airliner. This will only be possible if Azerbaijan possesses the required air to air missiles. According to some sources, Azerbaijan possesses R-27 (AA-10 ALAMO) missiles in its inventory to arm the MiG-29S.  These weapons have a range of approximately 80 kilometers. R-27's are capable air-to-air missiles sufficient for downing a cooperative target such as a passenger plane. Armenia’s only option of resistance in this department to scramble Armenian Su-25 (FROGFOOT) strike aircraft which will offer limited defence if the aim was to shoot down the MiG-29S before it launched its R-27 missile. Armenia does have the option to shoot down the MIG after the missile is launched as it will send the R27 missile wild and make it miss its target. The Armenian Su-25 predisposition is close air support not air to air dogfighting and could quite easily leave itself open to be shot down by the MIG even before its attempt to shoot it down. Azeri MIG Fulcrum C will have the capability to simultaneously track two targets and down the airliner as well as the Armenian SU-25. Armenia’s will need upgraded MIGs in its inventory to scramble and to take out the MIG in order to make sure the launched R27 will miss its target. Jamming the seeker heads of incoming R-27 missiles is also possible if Armenia had aircraft to scramble fitted with the proper equipment.  Such equipment is not the most difficult technology to acquire but more than anything is costly for Armenia.

Armenia's only viable option in the case with its President on board is to counter the Azeri offensive and take out the MIGs with a SAM such as the 2K11 before any such air-to-air missile can be launched or as a last option to take out the MIG after the missile launch. Accurate track data can be acquired from 36D6 radar systems to track the flight path of Azeri MIGS in order to shoot them down before any missile is fired at the airliner. This can also prove difficult for Armenia, as the Azeri MIG can launch at a range of up to 80 kilometers while Armenia's 2K11 will have a range of 50 kilometers. Again, Armenia is lacking its fighter aircraft to complete the job, being forced to rely on SAM systems by default. The 36D6 will provide quality coverage of the airspace to track the incoming MiG, the issue being whether it fall within the range of the Armenian 2K11 battery. Will Armenia navigate the 2K11 close enough to counter the offensive in time?

Armenia’s last option is to sit a S300PS at the airport with a range of 90km.This will ensure the downing of the Azeri MIG and definitely send the R27 wild. The S300PS in Armenia sit in the Suinik region in Armenia. The S300PS is a very capable system with a very high hit to kill probability. No issue’s will arise in terms of range and reaction time, the S300PS will do its job and do it sufficiently, depending on its station. From the fixed site in Armenia hitting a the MIG-29 before R27 hits the airline can prove difficult though S300Ps are highly maneuverable and can be brought closer to the target.

In conclusion, Armenia has options to defend its passenger aircraft from any such threat in the possible future. Firstly a disciplined air defence network in order to relay correct information regarding flying MIGs in the vicinity from Azeri military airfields will ensure that the passenger aircraft has sufficient time to start an early descent. It seems that this is Armenia’s only effective and affordable option.  Traffic control will need to warn the passenger airliner of an incoming threat and provide the plane with enough time to make crucial decision of changing its flight path and descending early to land. This is still a gamble if MiG-29 has fired its R-27 early on. This is where the S300PS system will complete its job, ensuring the MIG is shot down once a missile has been launched. Armenia’s next option will be to purchase jamming equipment.  The jamming option is plausible, as acquiring fighter type aircraft should be in Armenia’s military acquisitions if it wants to provide a robust defence for its nation. Using the fighter type aircraft to down the MIG after any such missile is launched is another option for Armenia though the S300PS can do this job. Furthermore, jamming systems could be placed on passenger airliners themselves.  Armenia’s money will best be spent in jamming technology if its goal is to prevent a disaster and forestall an all-out war in the region.

In light of recent developments in Azerbiajan's air defence systems, and since the original article was written some time ago, Azerbaijan's procurement of BUK-M1 and Pechora 2M systems provide a new insight in their options to shoot down an aircraft. Although the hype and media craze on this issue has subsided and negotiations regarding air space for international flights are continuing the understanding of Azerbaijan’s latest developments in there military arsenal provides insight on their capabilities. And reading this article as the first article in a set of series will provide avid readers on the most informative military articles written on the Nagrono Karabagh region. BuK-M1 a highly sophisticated system with a range of 25km-30km might fall short of its target, though its highly maneuverable tracked vehicle can be brought closer to the target under cover. If Azerbaijan was desperate enough to stoop that level to ensure a hit, its possibility of its use is a viable option on any landing aircraft.  What is more threatening is the anti-jamming capability of the system, as they are a sophisticated development in the Russian air defence arsenal. The Pechora 2M a modern upgrade of the old Pechora has an improved hit to kill ratio, again its limited range, it capability outside the 30km will have its limitations. Though once in range and if fired, both these systems provide a threat not only to the passenger airline but to transport aircraft in the region. Further detailed analysis is needed to weigh up possibilities of these newer and more sophisticated systems. With a slightly lesser range though more sophisticated technology, maneuverability and its low to medium altitude track capability is a whole new ballgame in Azerbaijan’s new line of defence procurement's regarding shooting down aircraft in any new conflict. Understand effects on aircraft landing at the Stepanakert airport is vital in a resumption of hostilities. The S300PMU-2 is another likely option though current military strategy proposes that there objective is to be used for the safety of Baku and its oilfileds and the use of their extended range will be a less likely option for the extended mountainous terrain of Karabagh.

The most favorable option again at this time of writing is the scrambling of MIG-29's purely because of the missiles range. Armenia's most viable option to defend itself other than the S300PS against the MIG-29 is to perhaps not only mimic but to trade ideas and technology from Israel with aircraft countermeasures. Chafs and flares are used on all Israeli passenger aircraft. They are highly versed in countermeasure Technics on passenger aircraft as well as all evading tactics on fighter jets. Jamming pods and larger jamming systems are needed in Armenia for the safety of all aircraft in the vicinity.

Sources:

"Imint Analysis" Sean O'Connor

"Air Power Australia"

"Google Earth Imagery"

S300PS in Armenia “Dissecting Armenia’s military strategy”

Image of S300 site under construction image 2009, this current site holds the S300PS note the old Krug systems that it has replaced in the middle left hand area. 

The red triangle depicts the above S300PS site, within the borders of Armenia.


The S300PS significance in Armenia is one noteworthy to present with analysis. The acquisition of the S300PS adds another level to its air defence capability. To the overall air defence of the nation the S300PS adds a shoot and scoot 5 minute tear down and redeployment of a highly sophisticated surface to air missile system. It provides Armenia with another 10 target simultaneous capability.  Tracking capability is unfortunately at 3/4 strength with one battalion with 4 launch vehicles allowing only 4 missiles to be simultaneously launched, an otherwise 12 launch capability is possible with two full strength battalions.

What is noteworthy to mention is its location, as imagery presents a typical S300 site which replaced the two Krug battalions in the south of the nation. This strategic location plays an important role in understanding a part of the geopolitics in the region; in particular with the extended range of the S300PS with a 90km radius over the conventional S300, it presents a new level of air defence coverage for Karabagh. In previous articles I have mentioned a lack of sophisticated systems in the Karabagh region, though those deficiencies are null with these two new battalions in the Syunik region.  The S300PS is placed in the South of Armenia, well within the borders of Armenia proper. The 90km range covers the whole Nagorno Karabagh enclave, and with additional support from air defence systems in the enclave it provides the east of Armenia including Karabagh a robust air defence system considering the limited threat from Azerbaijan.

The location of these S300PS protects the batteries from artillery from Azerbaijan and the obvious alliance between Armenian and Russia will also play a role in protecting these systems as they fall within the borders of Armenia. The careful placing of these two batteries not only relieves Nagorno Karabagh forces from intense counter battery artillery work  to ensure safety of air defence systems in the enclave, it provides Armenia 10 targets to be used at mercy within 3 sec intervals at its pace to offset the Azerbaijan air force.  The logical though strategic process of limiting air defence in the enclave and providing an umbrella of air defence from the safety of Armenian territory is intelligent and strategic move on behalf of military advisers whether from Russia or Armenia. The pace in which the upgrades of air defences in Armenia is one to question, though from a military analysis the air defence coverage is definitely noteworthy. What does this mean for Armenia? On one hand it shows the reluctance of Russia to get involved in the a battle in the Nagorno Karabagh region from its passive reluctance to arm the enclave with more sophisticated type of technology, though on the other hand, it shows a strong military doctrine in the protection of its ally Armenia in any potential conflict.  Careful planning ensures Armenian forces a level playing field against the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s 3 billion dollar military budget which will increase to 3.7 billion next year compared to Armenia miniscule 400 million dollar budget. 

Sources:
"Imint Analysis" Sean O'Connor
"Air Power Australia"
"Google Earth Imagery"