Nagorno Karabagh "Contact Line"

Stepanakert Airport under construction 2009

(Courtesy Google Earth)

Armenian president Serj Sarkisian announced that he will be the first passenger on the flight to the newly rebuilt airport in Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia has rebuilt the airport north of the capital Stepanakert. Azerbaijan maintains that Nagorno-Karabakh remains a part of the nation, and considers Nagorno-Karabakh’s airspace as its own.  Azerbaijan's continued rhetoric and its latest announcement that it will shoot down any plane that violates its airspace is of interest to anyone in the field of air defence and anyone who follows the politics of the volatile Caucasus.  These announcements call for a greater analysis of the region as any aggression against a head of state represents an act of war. It is important to know that Armenian forces control the Nagorno Karabakh airspace, and to understand how Azerbaijan may shoot down the airliner. 

Nagorno Karabakh is an area encompassing roughly 10 000 square kilometres. Fierce fighting from 1988 and an all out war from 1991 lead to the capture of Nagorno Karabakh and further territory outside the enclave of the considered Nagorno Karabagh region which is now a part of Armenian territory. Since the shaky cease-fire in 1994, sporadic firefights and sniper attacks occur on the contact line. Both sides are heavily armed and guarded with trenches similar to World War I. The Armenian side has feared an all-out attack since the cease-fire, especially with President Aliyev’s large military budget from oil revenue.  Armenia has fully fortified its lowlands with three lines of trenches reaching from the Mrav Mountains to the north to another mountain chain close to Fizuli in the south. No signs of compromise have been initiated from either side at the negotiation table.

The airport falls short of the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) battalions stationed in Azerbaijan. The 2K11 is a mobile system that can be relocated closer to the target. Higher echelon 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radars will ensure notification of the flight path and timing, allowing the 2K11 battery to close to the range needed to launch on a target arriving at Khankendi airport. A passenger airliner represents a cooperative target for the 2K11, making the 2K11 a likely SAM option for Azerbaijan’s purpose. Two main reasons account for this.  First Azerbaijan can account for the disaster as an accident, and second, it reduces its chances of their aircraft being downed from retaliatory fire if a fighter aircraft was scrambled to complete the job.  The engagement envelope of the 2K11, a medium to high altitude SAM system, must be considered. The 1S32 (PAT HAND) engagement radar will have difficulty illuminating the target in the mountainous terrain and at the maximum range of its engagement envelope.  The airliner will be descending to land reaching the airport, further complicating the 1S32’s illumination. This option will prove difficult for President Aliyev and therefore represents a possible but not probable scenario.

Azerbaijan's other option will be to scramble fighter aircraft such as the MiG-29S (FULCRUM-C) to fire air-to-air missiles. This will be the most effective way to bring down the airliner. This will only be possible if Azerbaijan possesses the required air to air missiles. According to some sources, Azerbaijan possesses R-27 (AA-10 ALAMO) missiles in its inventory to arm the MiG-29S.  These weapons have a range of approximately 80 kilometers. R-27's are capable air-to-air missiles sufficient for downing a cooperative target such as a passenger plane. Armenia’s only option of resistance in this department to scramble Armenian Su-25 (FROGFOOT) strike aircraft which will offer limited defence if the aim was to shoot down the MiG-29S before it launched its R-27 missile. Armenia does have the option to shoot down the MIG after the missile is launched as it will send the R27 missile wild and make it miss its target. The Armenian Su-25 predisposition is close air support not air to air dogfighting and could quite easily leave itself open to be shot down by the MIG even before its attempt to shoot it down. Azeri MIG Fulcrum C will have the capability to simultaneously track two targets and down the airliner as well as the Armenian SU-25. Armenia’s will need upgraded MIGs in its inventory to scramble and to take out the MIG in order to make sure the launched R27 will miss its target. Jamming the seeker heads of incoming R-27 missiles is also possible if Armenia had aircraft to scramble fitted with the proper equipment.  Such equipment is not the most difficult technology to acquire but more than anything is costly for Armenia.

Armenia's only viable option in the case with its President on board is to counter the Azeri offensive and take out the MIGs with a SAM such as the 2K11 before any such air-to-air missile can be launched or as a last option to take out the MIG after the missile launch. Accurate track data can be acquired from 36D6 radar systems to track the flight path of Azeri MIGS in order to shoot them down before any missile is fired at the airliner. This can also prove difficult for Armenia, as the Azeri MIG can launch at a range of up to 80 kilometers while Armenia's 2K11 will have a range of 50 kilometers. Again, Armenia is lacking its fighter aircraft to complete the job, being forced to rely on SAM systems by default. The 36D6 will provide quality coverage of the airspace to track the incoming MiG, the issue being whether it fall within the range of the Armenian 2K11 battery. Will Armenia navigate the 2K11 close enough to counter the offensive in time?

Armenia’s last option is to sit a S300PS at the airport with a range of 90km.This will ensure the downing of the Azeri MIG and definitely send the R27 wild. The S300PS in Armenia sit in the Suinik region in Armenia. The S300PS is a very capable system with a very high hit to kill probability. No issue’s will arise in terms of range and reaction time, the S300PS will do its job and do it sufficiently, depending on its station. From the fixed site in Armenia hitting a the MIG-29 before R27 hits the airline can prove difficult though S300Ps are highly maneuverable and can be brought closer to the target.

In conclusion, Armenia has options to defend its passenger aircraft from any such threat in the possible future. Firstly a disciplined air defence network in order to relay correct information regarding flying MIGs in the vicinity from Azeri military airfields will ensure that the passenger aircraft has sufficient time to start an early descent. It seems that this is Armenia’s only effective and affordable option.  Traffic control will need to warn the passenger airliner of an incoming threat and provide the plane with enough time to make crucial decision of changing its flight path and descending early to land. This is still a gamble if MiG-29 has fired its R-27 early on. This is where the S300PS system will complete its job, ensuring the MIG is shot down once a missile has been launched. Armenia’s next option will be to purchase jamming equipment.  The jamming option is plausible, as acquiring fighter type aircraft should be in Armenia’s military acquisitions if it wants to provide a robust defence for its nation. Using the fighter type aircraft to down the MIG after any such missile is launched is another option for Armenia though the S300PS can do this job. Furthermore, jamming systems could be placed on passenger airliners themselves.  Armenia’s money will best be spent in jamming technology if its goal is to prevent a disaster and forestall an all-out war in the region.

In light of recent developments in Azerbiajan's air defence systems, and since the original article was written some time ago, Azerbaijan's procurement of BUK-M1 and Pechora 2M systems provide a new insight in their options to shoot down an aircraft. Although the hype and media craze on this issue has subsided and negotiations regarding air space for international flights are continuing the understanding of Azerbaijan’s latest developments in there military arsenal provides insight on their capabilities. And reading this article as the first article in a set of series will provide avid readers on the most informative military articles written on the Nagrono Karabagh region. BuK-M1 a highly sophisticated system with a range of 25km-30km might fall short of its target, though its highly maneuverable tracked vehicle can be brought closer to the target under cover. If Azerbaijan was desperate enough to stoop that level to ensure a hit, its possibility of its use is a viable option on any landing aircraft.  What is more threatening is the anti-jamming capability of the system, as they are a sophisticated development in the Russian air defence arsenal. The Pechora 2M a modern upgrade of the old Pechora has an improved hit to kill ratio, again its limited range, it capability outside the 30km will have its limitations. Though once in range and if fired, both these systems provide a threat not only to the passenger airline but to transport aircraft in the region. Further detailed analysis is needed to weigh up possibilities of these newer and more sophisticated systems. With a slightly lesser range though more sophisticated technology, maneuverability and its low to medium altitude track capability is a whole new ballgame in Azerbaijan’s new line of defence procurement's regarding shooting down aircraft in any new conflict. Understand effects on aircraft landing at the Stepanakert airport is vital in a resumption of hostilities. The S300PMU-2 is another likely option though current military strategy proposes that there objective is to be used for the safety of Baku and its oilfileds and the use of their extended range will be a less likely option for the extended mountainous terrain of Karabagh.

The most favorable option again at this time of writing is the scrambling of MIG-29's purely because of the missiles range. Armenia's most viable option to defend itself other than the S300PS against the MIG-29 is to perhaps not only mimic but to trade ideas and technology from Israel with aircraft countermeasures. Chafs and flares are used on all Israeli passenger aircraft. They are highly versed in countermeasure Technics on passenger aircraft as well as all evading tactics on fighter jets. Jamming pods and larger jamming systems are needed in Armenia for the safety of all aircraft in the vicinity.

Sources:

"Imint Analysis" Sean O'Connor

"Air Power Australia"

"Google Earth Imagery"